Abstract -Web applications offer business and convenience services that society has become dependent on, such as online banking. Success of these applications is dependent on end user trust, although these services have serious weaknesses that can be exploited by attackers. Application owners must take additional steps to ensure the security of customer data and integrity of the applications, since web applications are under siege from cyber criminals seeking to steal confidential information and disable or damage the services offered by these applications. Successful attacks have lead to some organizations experiencing financial difficulties or even being forced out of business. Organizations have insufficient tools to detect and respond to attacks on web applications, since traditional security logs have gaps that make attack reconstruction nearly impossible. This paper explores network recording challenges, benefits and possible future use. A network recording solution is proposed to detect and capture SQL injection attacks, resulting in the ability to successfully reconstruct SQL injection attacks in order to maintain application integrity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pervasive availability and convenience of services delivered through web application technologies has made society dependent on these services as business-to-business and business-to-consumer functions have made it easier than ever to communicate, research, learn, organize ourselves and conduct business. The dependence on web applications also increases our exposure to the effects of attacks that may directly impact individuals through compromise of confidential information, resulting in identity theft or denial of services. This may further compound into lost revenue and possibly liabilities, as illustrated by attacks forcing companies out of business [1] . Continued success of these applications is completely dependent on trust placed in the applications by the users and this demands increased levels of security to protect these services from attackers seeking to obtain financial and identity information or disrupt services [2] .
In August 2008, hostilities between Russia and Georgia resulted in devastating denial of service attacks that shut down Georgia news agencies and government functions [3] . A cyber-security policy report prepared for US President Obama indicates over $1 trillion dollars of key intellectual property was stolen through cyber security breaches in 2008 alone [4] . Over 640,000 sites were successfully attacked in the third quarter of 2009, with approximately 5.8 million successful attacks throughout 2009 [5] . Victim sites included recognizable non-profit, government and business organizations [6] .
The Verizon Business Risk Team determined there were 285 million records stolen in 2008 through only 90 confirmed breaches. Of those breaches, SQL injection attacks were the top among flaws exploited. Exacerbating the problem is the ineffectiveness of traditional network security measures such as firewalls that block all traffic other than HTTP or HTTPS ports, since the majority of attacks are now targeted at the application layer [7] . Web application security flaws, including SQL injection attacks, are the primary exploit vector for attackers and have been shown by the NIST National Vulnerability Database to still be increasing in volume. Kieyzun et al [8] state up to 70% of the web applications responsible for handling much of the business conducted over the Internet today are affected by insecure software.
Attackers are using powerful exploit frameworks to successfully attack web applications with point and click ease. Comprehensive new forensic tools are required that can definitively reveal how web applications have been attacked and what related activities were committed by the attacker.
Investigation of these application attacks is often hindered by incomplete forensic information. Sparse forensic information makes it difficult or even impossible to identify the exploited flaw or the perpetrators. Organizations are seeking ways to improve the reconstruction of web attacks in order to understand and remedy web application vulnerabilities as well as support criminal or civil legal proceedings. This paper shows the value of employing network forensic techniques and technologies to improve investigation of SQL injection attacks on web applications. Use of network based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) tools to trigger network recording of suspected application attacks could substantially improve the effectiveness of reconstructing SQL injection attacks. The remainder of this paper offers discussion and analysis of IDS triggered network recording and the use of recordings to reconstruct a simple SQL injection attack.
A. Related Work
We are unaware of existing projects or papers that parallel the objective of this paper. There are several related topics that we draw on heavily to produce the conclusions and in fact our body of work could not exist without these prior projects, including the Bro-IDS, Time Machine (TM) network recording project, network payload reconstitution and SQL injection detection. There are commercial network recording products including NetWitness and Niksun NetDetector, however they do not appear to offer tight integration with IDS. Although current literature focuses on web application security, investigation of security breaches and network forensics, this paper highlights the effectiveness of network recording to determine the exact attack vector used and the extent of the intrusion. Based on these facts, we believe the ideas expressed in this paper are new work.
B. Web Application Vulnerabilities and Exploitation
Web application attacks occur via several different types of vulnerabilities where Injection and Cross Site Scripting (XSS) flaws are the most serious [9] . From 2002 to 2008, the NVD showed a 1,561% increase in the number of known SQL injection flaws, compared to buffer overflow flaws, which showed a 563% increase from 1997 to 2008, revealing a dangerous trend where SQL injection flaws have overtaken memory corruption flaws. Verizon observed that SQL injection attacks are the source of the majority of records stolen (79%) over approximately 600 incident response cases. Several attacker sites include exploits for popular web applications, and a survey of several attack tool websites found 47% of the exploits were oriented to performing SQL injection attacks.
C. SQL Injection Attacks
Web application servers send low-level SQL queries to a database in order to build the HTML needed for user presentation, typically through application API calls such as JDBC. Problems arise when programmers do not handle user input properly, resulting in unintended direct user interaction with the database. Since low-level string manipulation is used to dynamically build database SQL queries based on user input, if that input is not handled correctly, unintended modification of the SQL queries can happen [10] . Results include unintended query functions [11] . For example [10] : query = "SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE name='" + request.getParameter("name") + "' AND password='" + request.getParameter("pass") + "'";
This code is intended to authenticate a user, however can be subverted when an attacker enters ' OR ' a'='a' into the password field. This specially crafted input generates the following query with the result of the conditional logic always returning true, allowing the attacker to bypass remaining authentication logic.
SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE name='admin' AND password='' OR 'a'='a'
Once an attacker confirms an application is vulnerable to SQL injection attacks, they can progress to enumerating the database schema and alteration or insert of rows, leading to horizontal and/or vertical privilege escalation.
II. ATTACK ANALYSIS
Traditional digital forensics [12] relies on log meta data relating to web transactions, including network and application firewalls, IDS, operating system and web server logs, and application logs [13] . These logs are often insufficient for forensic purposes since they were only designed for system debugging purposes [14] . Where network-recording capabilities do not exist, the investigator is forced to reconstruct events from incomplete data [15, 16] , often resulting in poor quality since they are left to deduce system or data changes and events from sparse forensic information [14] . With lack of detailed information to illuminate the precise actions of the attacker, determination of exactly what the attacker did and on which systems is difficult, if not impossible, therefore the increased level of data provided by network recordings are needed [17] . 
Listing 1: Web server log meta-data and HTTP POST data
Listing 1 shows log data for a successful web application access, where the investigator can see attacker (10.10.21.12) was permitted access to the web server. Nothing further is known from the firewall logs other than which hosts and services node attacker specifically tried to access. Even with the first entry showing a firewall accept of a TCP connection to node web11, there is no indication that a web server was running on that server, if the TCP connection or HTTP transaction was successful. The web server log entry shows the web server successfully served a HTTP POST request. There is no way to deduce this was a malicious request through log data analysis alone. 
Listing 2: Web server log meta-data and HTTP POST data
Listing 2 further illustrates the dangerous gap between transaction meta data recorded by the web server followed by a HTTP network conversation payload capture, where the network recording shows the password variable containing a SQL injection attack ' or 1=1 --that was not revealed in the web server transaction log.
A. Network Traffic Recording
Chen et al. [12] discuss methods to collect and analyze evidence of attacks that could be used to reveal successful and unsuccessful attacks on web applications. Maier et al. [18] take this approach further, by incorporating IDS controlled application payload recording, preserving suspicious activity for retrospective inclusion in subsequent investigations.
In addition to enabling reconstruction of SQL injection attacks, network recordings are a valuable source of compelling digital evidence since it can be used to show the actions of an offender like a surveillance video tape of a crime [12, 14, 19] . Using network traffic as digital evidence does have numerous drawbacks including possible errors in reconstruction of the traffic payload [19] and sheer volume of unconstrained network recording, in terms of network traffic, required processing resources and disk space [20] .
To address this limitation, our solution uses the Bro-IDS project for the built-in interfaces and ability to leverage and control the recording resources of a TM [18] . We use this integration between Bro-IDS and TM to dynamically change recording parameters set within TM. The policy language developed by the Bro-IDS project is geared to the specialized task of analyzing and monitoring network traffic, and includes event level linkages to a TM, enabling retrospective analysis of suspicious traffic by the IDS and security analysts.
The bulk of traffic in high volume streams typically occurs with a relatively small number of connections [18, 21] . Most network connections are short, with a small number of large connections making up the majority of the network traffic [21] . The TM project implements an algorithm to capture sufficient detail at the beginning of network streams while discarding the heavy tail [21] or bulk of the transaction data, referred to as a cutoff point. This approach results in substantial data recording reduction while maintaining enough of the transaction for identification and to illustrate an attacker's actions. Since for forensic purposes [18, 21, 22] , the packet headers and a relatively small amount of the payload from the beginning can accurately fingerprint connection patterns [22] , the overall volume of traffic payload recorded can be reduced by as much as 96% [21] .
B. Reconstruction of SQL injection attack
A vulnerability assessment of the victim application [23] revealed manipulation of the password parameter used in a POST operation was possible (Listing 3).
SQL injection in a MySQL database was found at: "http://web11/mutillidae/index.php?page=user -info.php", using HTTP method POST. The sent post-data was: "view_user_name=LzGulbg&password=d'z"0&Submi t_button=Submit". The modified parameter was "password". As shown by the evidence captured by Time Machine, in the actual SQL injection attack, the vulnerable password parameter was assigned a value as password=%22%27+OR+1%3D1+--+%22 , resulting in the SQL injection attack ' OR 1=1 --modifying the SQL query to SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='admin' AND password='' OR 1=1 --. This allows the attacker to successfully bypass authentication for the administrative user.
Listing 3: HTML POST vulnerability in Mutillidae

III. CONCLUSION
A majority of web applications used for handling business over the Internet have serious security flaws, enabling successful attacks. Organizations have insufficient tools to detect and respond to attacks on web applications, since traditional security logs have gaps that make attack reconstruction nearly impossible.
Traditionally, precise actions of the attackers is difficult to determine, therefore the increased level of data provided by network recordings are needed.
Leveraging IDS controlled application payload recording allows for preservation of suspicious activity for retrospective inclusion in subsequent investigations. These recordings are a valuable source of compelling digital evidence since it can be used to show the actions of an offender like a surveillance videotape of a crime. Although high traffic volumes are difficult to indiscriminately record, use of heavy-tail and focused recording techniques enable effective SQL injection attack reconstruction that would have previously gone undetected. 
